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ABSTRACT
This paper uses financial statement data for large samples of U.S. and
Japanese nonfinancial corporations to estimate the return to capital in each
country for the period 1967-83. Interpreting these as measures of the cost of
capital, we find that the before-tax cost of corporate capital was higher for
U.S. firms than for their Japanese counterparts, with theaverage gap
potentially as high as 5.8 percentage points. The use of alternative
measurement techniques alters the gap slightly but does not alter the basic
finding. However, market returns in the two countries were much closerduring
the same period.
Certain potential explanations for the gap in returns are rejectedby
empirical evidence, including differences in corporate taxation, differences in
borrowing and differences in asset mix. This leaves three potential
explanations: differences in risk, differences in the tax treatment of
individual capital income and imperfections in the international flow of
capital.
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In the past few years, the enormous U.S. trade deficit and, in
particular, the bilateral trade deficit with Japan, has led to serious
industrial and political problems in the U.S., with trade-sensitive industries
experiencing serious declines in demand and employment and seeking protection
and trade sanctions. The severity of these problems has led economists and
others to search for their source. Certainly a major factor implicated is the
U.S. federal budget deficit, which has hovered around 5 percent of GNP in
recent years, far above the levels previously experienced during peacetime.
These deficits have been blamed for high real interest rates which, in turn,
helped keep the U.S. dollar strong until the past two years. Though the U.S.
trade balance has very recently improved somewhat, it still remains quite large
long after the dollar's decline began.
Other attempts to explain Japan's favorable trade position with respect
to the U.S. have focused on differences between the structure of the Japanese
and American economies and government policies toward business. Some have
suggested that Japanese business is more efficiently organized, while others
have argued that Japan imposes barriers to American firms' attempts at
establishing markets, either through explicit policy actions or collusive
behavior among government, industry and the banking sector. An additional
possible explanation, which is the subject of this paper's investigation, is
that Japanese firms face a lower cost of capital, giving capital intensive
Japanese companies a competitive advantage over their American rivals.
This explanation is not entirely independent of the others already
mentioned, since the U.S. cost of capital would be elevated by the high real—2—
interest rates induced by domestic deficits, and Japanese borrowing costs
could be lowered by targeted lending below market rates. There are, however,
many additional factors that could contribute to a cost of capital
differential between the two counties. These include differences in the
taxation of capital income, capital market restrictions that could cause the
higher Japanese level of savings to drive down domestic returns to capital
rather than flow abroad, and differences in the perceived riskiness of
investments or investor attitudes toward risk in the two countries.
Our approach involves the use of market and financial statement data for
nonfinancial corporations in the U.S. and Japan. We extend our earlier study
on the same subject (Ando and Auerbach, 1985) by considering a large part of
the nonfinancial corporate sector in each country rather than a small
representative sample of firms, and by testing the sensitivity of our measures
of the cost of capital to a variety of alternative assumptions. All of the
measures we use are based on observed returns of corporations. The
fundamental premise that underlies this approach is that, in the long run,
corporations will earn, before tax, a rate of return relative to the value of
their securities just sufficient to achieve their cost of capital, taking
account of risk, taxes, and the required returns to holders of debt and
equity. This need not be the case in any given year, since unanticipated
events can cause returns to be above or below their expected values. Hence,
we compute our statistics over a period of nearly two decades, extending from
1967 to 1984 (to 1983 for Japan).-3--
2. The Data and Initial Estimates
Our data source for the U.S. is the COMPUSTAT Tapes,1 and for Japan the
NEEDS-NIKKEI Financial Data Tapes.2 Information on both tapes is both based
on published reports from companies themselves, and while they are similar
enough to make comparisons between the two countries possible, we must be
careful to allow for a number of critical differences in institutions
including accounting rules used in the two countries, as well as tax laws. We
shall discuss the critical differences involved and make some adjustments for
them as we proceed with our analysis.
We begin, in Table 1, with familiar ratios of earnings to price after
taxes and the rate of return on total capital before and after taxes, without
any adjustment. The rate of return on total capital before tax is defined as
earnings after tax plus taxes plus interest payments divided by the sum of
total financial debt and the market value of equity. The return after tax
equals earnings after tax plus interest payments, less the imputed tax
deduction received for the interest payments, divided by the same base. We
see that, for Japan, the earnings price ratio generally declines slowly during
the period of 1967 to 1983, while the total return to capital is very low and
does not have any discernible trend.
For the U.S., the trend is less obvious, with the earnings-price ratio
increasing during the 1970s, then falling recently. Because of the increased
real interest rates in the U.S., there is no decline on returns to capital in
the 1980s, with such returns having been stable since about 1978. For Japan,
except for a period in the mid 1970s, the returns to capital have been quite-4-
stable. Overall, the numbers suggest a rate of return to capital that is much
higher in the U.S. than in Japan.
3.Adjustments to the Measured Rates of Return
These figures should not be taken too seriously because they require a
series of adjustments in order for them to be meaningful, and for figures for
the two countries to be comparable. There are five potentially major
adjustments that we will consider in this paper, three of them related to
inflation and the remaining two associated with institutional differences
between the two countries.
A.Correction for Depreciation Under Inflationary Conditions
In both Japan and the U.S., reported depreciation is based on original
cost. It is well known that this procedure understates the amount of
depreciation under inflationary conditions, and to this extent earnings and
the net return on capital will be overstated.
To correct for this understatement of depreciation, we begin by assuming
that depreciation would be properly measured in the absence of inflation since
we are unable to assume otherwise. To restate depreciation based on original
cost in current dollar terms requires information on the vintage structure of
each year's overall depreciation, since the price factor by which book
depreciation must be inflated depends on the age of the asset to which the
depreciation applies. We produce an estimated vintage structure in the
following manner.3 We first assume that the net (of depreciation) capital
stock listed in the first year requires no correction. This is reasonable,—5-
given the low rates of inflation in both countries in the years immediately
preceding the mid-1960s. We then assume that each corporation's depreciable
assets are written off using the declining balance method at a single rate.
Finally, using the perpetual thventory method, we solve for the value of this
rate that would yield the listed book value for net capital in the last year




whereKt is the book value of net capital at the end of year t and is the
book value of gross investment during year t. Since all these values of I and
K are positive, the solution for 6 is unique. There are additional problems
presented by each country's data set. For Japan, there are no separate
figures listed for gross investment. We impute an investment series from the
sum of depreciation and the first difference of the net capital stock. For
the U.S., there are no separate figures for land and depreciable assets, only
the sum. This should lower the estimate of the average depreciation rate,
since land is nondepreciable. In addition, the treatment of assets acquired
through merger rather than direct investment is inconsistent; they appear in
the capital stock, but are not in reported investment. We performed
calculations for the U.S. using both reported investment and, as was necessary
for Japan, imputed investment. Estimated values of 6 were generally lower and
more reasonable (given previous estimates) when imputed investment was used.
Because of this, as well as to be as consistent as possible in our
methodologies for the two countries, we present calculations based on imputed-6-
rather than actual investment. The depreciation rates are interesting in
their own right and are given for both countries in Table 2. The variation
across industries is consistent with general expectations. Firms in the
construction industry, for example, evidence very rapid rates compared to
retailers, whose capital is largely in the form of build-ings.
In general, the estimated depreciation rates for Japan are higher than
those for the U.S. Clearly, one explanation, which we accept, is that
Japanese assets actually do depreciate more rapidly, because of suchfactors
as differences in composition. For example, land is excluded from the
calculations for Japan. However, there may be other factors that reflect
accounting differences rather than economic ones, such as the greater
flexibility U.S. firms have in choosing depreciation for tax purposes and
financial accounting purposes. This is an issue which would benefit from
further consideration.
With these estimated rates of economic depreciation, we went back and
estimated current dollar capital stocks using the expression:
(2) K =* (K*(1_6)T/p+I* * T11+
wherePt is a price index (the gross national expendituredeflator for Japan
and the gross domestic business product deflator for the U.S.). Depreciation
in year 'c is estimated to be o*K1, and the difference between this measure
and the listed book measure is subtracted from earnings.
This adjustment lowers the net return on equity on average by about
2 percent in both Japan and the U.S.—7-.
B.Capital Gains and Losses on Financial Assets and Liabilities
Under inflationary conditions, firms earn real capital gains on financial
liabilities that are fixed in nominal terms, while they incur real capital
losses on financial assets fixed in nominal terms. The ratio of earnings to
price suffers from the lack of adjustment for both of these possibilities,
and hence the earnings price ratio must be corrected for the net capital gain
(or loss) accruing to the net debtor-creditor position of the firm. The ratio
of total return to capital, however, is unaffected by the capital gain on
debt, because the return on equity should be adjusted for the gain on the debt
while the return to creditors must be adjusted for the same gain in the
opposite direction, thus cancelling each other out. Therefore, in the case of
the total return on capital, the required adjustment is only on the capital
loss on nominally fixed financial assets of the firm, net of nominal
liabilities not classified as debt.4
We have made these corrections on both Japanese and U.S. data. Because
Japanese firms tend to have more financial assets relative to real assets, the
adjustment to the total return on capital is somewhat larger for Japanese
firms than for U.S. firms. Because Japanese firms also have more debt, net of
financial assets, the average correction to the earnings price ratio is much
larger for Japan, at 6.2 percentage points, than for the U.S., at 2.3
percentage points.
C.Adjustments to the Cost of Inventory Sold
As is well known, the use of certain inventory accounting systems, such
as First-Out (FIFO), understates the cost of goods sold during inflationary-8-
periods and therefore causes the earnings of the firm to be overstated. This
overstatement of profits is much smaller under the Last-In, First-Out (LIFO)
system, although it is not altogether eliminated, while under other systems
such as the average cost method the overstatement of earnings typically is
smaller than under FIFO but greather than under LIFO.
The algorithm used to restate the cost of goods sold proceeds as follows.
First, we assume that firms use either FIFO, LIFO or Average Cost accounting
in each year. Other methods listed (such as Specific Cost) are assigned to
whichever of these three major methods they most closely resemble, in our
judgment.
Based on stated methods, we then estimate, for each firm in Japan, the
predominant method of accounting for inventories in each year. For the U.S.,
the predominant method is already indicated by Compustat. Each firm is
assumed to account for all its inventories using its predominant method.
Because there were occasional switches in this method over time (in the U.S.
usually toward the use of LIFO) we allow one break during the sample period
where the predominant method may change (there were few cases of multiple
switches, and these were ignored). Thus, a firm switching from FIFO to LIFO
in 1973 will be assumed to have a FIFO fraction of 1.0 through 1972 and a LIFO
fraction of 1.0 thereafter.
To perform the inventory corrections, once the method of accounting has
been determined, we begin by assuming that all goods purchased in a given year
had a price equal to that year's price index, and that the initial year's
inventories are correctly stated. We then use book information on the cost of
goods sold and the change in inventories to estimate a time series of the cost—9-
of goods sold in current dollars. The method by which this -isdoneis
different for each of the three methods. For LIFO, no change in cost of goods
sold is made unless book inventories declined, in which case the last previous
year of accumulation not already run down in the intervening yearsis
determined and an appropriate price correction made. For FIFO, a one-year
price adjustment is necessary for those goods sold in the current year
attributable to initial inventory stocks. For average cost, our correction is
based on the assumption that goods purchased in the current year are added to
stocks and the price corresponding to the cost of goods sold is the average
price at which this pool of goods in inventory is carried.
Once a current dollar measure of the cost of goods sold has been
calculated the difference between it and the book cost of goods sold is
subtracted from book earnings. This adjustment lowers the average after-tax
earnings price ratio by 1.2 percentage points for the U.S. and 2.7 percentage
points for Japan. It is thus of similar -importance, quantitatively, as the
capital consumption correction discussed above.
0.Special Problems of Japanese Accounting Practices
There are obvious differences between the accounting standard followed by
U.S. firms and that followed by Japanese firms. Without making any judgment
about their relative merits, for the purposes of comparing them against each
other, it is obvious that we have to make adjustments for significant
differences in accounting practices.
One type of accounts that appears quite often in the records of
Japanese firms but much less so in those of U.S. firms is"reserves.t' These-10-
are book entries which represent future costs to the firm resulting from its
current actions. For example, suppose the firm hires a worker during period
t, and incurs an obligation to pay him a certain amount of severance indemnity
at the time of his retirement in period t +1.The Japanese tax law then
allows the firm to record a contribution to this obligation in period t and to
deduct such a contribution from the earnings of the firm in period t for tax
purposes, subject to some well defined limitations. "Reserve" accounts are
used strictly for record keeping purposes, since contributions of the firm to
the severance indemnity are not made until the worker actually retires. Thus,
such reserve accounts should not be included among debts of the firm when
computing the total return to capital.
In our computation for Japanese companies, we have excluded the item
"Accrued Employees' Severance Indemnities" from the total liabilities of the
firm but left most other reserve accounts as recorded.5 The exclusion of
"Accrued Employees' Severance Indemnities" increases the earnings-price ratio
by an average of 1.1 percentage points. We have left other accounts labeled
"reserves" included in the liabilities of Japanese firms for the present
calculation because we are less sure of their nature.
A second potentially troublesome class of balance sheet items for
Japanese firms are financial assets. There are strong indications, from the
appearance of data themselves and from our conversations with Japanese
economists, that Japanese firms hold a proportionately larger amount of safe
financial assets than U.S. firms. If this is so and such financial assets are
financed by financial liabilities, this may cause the measured overall rate of
return to appear low in Japan even if the rate of return on real assets is—11—
not. We address this issue in our discussion below of the sensitivity of our
results to alternative assumptions.
E.Adjusted Measures of the Rate of Return
The adjusted rates of return are reported in Table 3. For Japan, the
earnings price ratio rises substantially because of the large inflation—
induced gain on financial liabilities, with the average rising from
6.5 percent to 9.2 percent. The before tax rate of return on total capital
drops from 9.5 percent to 6.5 percent. The latter falls because accounting
for the net loss on financial assets and understatement of depreciation and
inventory costs due, to inflation offsets the correction for the overstatement
of liabilities due to the presence of pension reserves. As before, the
Japanese earnings price ratio falls steadily over the period, but both
measures of the return to capital are relatively stable. This difference in
trends can be attributed to the steady decline since 1975 in Japanese
debt-value ratios, which are shown in Table 4 (as are those for the U.S.).
From a peak of 69 percent in 1972, the ratio of corrected debt to corrected
debt plus equity fell to 58 percent in 1983, with a sample average of 63
percent.
For the U.S., the correction lowers the earnings price ratio slightly
(from 9.4 percent to 8.4 percent) because the gain on financial liabilities is
much smaller than in Japan. Thus, the corrected Japanese earnings price ratio
average is actually somewhat higher. There is also a reduction in the average
estimated returns t,o capital for the U.S. similar to those for Japan once
corrections are made. Thus, the average before-tax returns still differ—12—
substantially by 5.8 percentage points, 12.3 percent for the U.S. versus 6.5
percent for Japan. This entire gap is attributable to the period after 1972.
For the period 1967—72, the average returns to capital in the two countries,
both before-tax and after-tax, are nearly identical.
These results are somewhat at variance with our earlier study, which
failed to identify a significant cost of capital differential between the two
countries. This indicates the value of examining more comprehensive sample of
firms, as we have here. Our estimated costs of capital and estimated gap are,
however, broadly consistent with the findings of Hatsopoulos and Brooks (1986).
4.Possible Explanations for the Cost of Capital Gap
In the previous section, we presented measures of the corrected earnings
price ratios and returns to capital for the U.S. and Japan. From these, it
appears that Japan has had a consistently lower cost of capital during the
past two decades, measured by the before tax return to capital. In this
section, we consider several explanations of the differences in the returns to
capital, some that would account for a cost of capital gap and others that
would attribute the gap in returns to factors other than an underlying
capital cost difference.
A.Differences in Corporate Tax Positions
Few have argued that Japanese companies enjoy more generous tax benefits
on real investments than their American counterparts. If they did, however,
this could help account for a lower Japanese cost of capital. This issue is
easily addressed by comparing the before—tax and after-tax returns to capital—13—
in the two countries. By construction, the gap in returns includes not only
taxes actually paid but also the taxes avoided through interest deductions.
Hence, they may be viewed as the taxes associated with real investment
decisions, leaving out the additional tax consequences of borrowing. The
latter are considered separately below. This distinction is useful because it
allows us to measure separately the effects of the tax system, given financial
policy, and the impact of differences in financial incentives and policies.
In the U.S., the average effective tax rate (equal to the difference
between before-tax and after-tax returns divided by the average before-tax
return) is 54 percent. In Japan, it is 65 percent. The absolute tax wedge is
larger in the U.S., 6.7 percentage points versus 4.2 percentage points, but
this still leaves a gap of 3.3 percentage points between the after-tax returns.
B.The Greater Use of Borrowed Funds in Japan
The average corrected returns to equity in the U.S. and Japan are very
similar, 8.4 percent versus 9.2 percent; so are the average real returns to
debt, 2.7 percent and 1.6 percent, respectively. Hence, in a statistical
sense, one may attribute the higher U.S. returns to capital to lower U.S.
debt-equity ratios. This does not imply, of course, that the gap would
disappear if U.S. companies borrowed more. The Modigliani-Miller, Theorem,
perhaps the most fundamental result in finance, reminds us that, except for
the differential tax treatment of debt and equity and the increase in firm
risk (such as through a higher probability of bankruptcy) associated with more
borrowing, changes in debt-equity ratios cannot affect the cost of capital.
An upper bound for the tax advantage to debt is the value of the interest-14—
deduction, since there are personal taxes in both countries favoring returns
to equity via the preferential treatment of capital gains. Hence, if Japanese
firms borrow more because there are smaller nontax costs (i.e. increases in
firm risk) to borrowing than in the U.S., the maximum effect of this
additional borrowing on the cost of capital gap is the full value of the
additional interest deduction as a fraction of total capital costs.
This upper bound on the net Japanese borrowing advantage is easily
calculated by estimating the before—tax returns to capital again, this time
ignoring the interest deduction, and seeing how much the gap in returns in the
two countries closes. The answer 15: very little. Ignoring the interest
deduction would raise the U.S. return to capital by an average of 1.6
percentage points and the Japanese return to capital by 1.8 percentage points,
for a maximum net difference of .2 percentage points in the cost of capital
attributable to additional borrowing in Japan. The effect is so small, in
part, because U.S. inflation and nominal interest rates were higher during
this period, making the interest deduction more valuable in the U.S. per
dollar of debt.
C.Liquid Assets in Japan
The Japanese firms in our sample hold substantially more liquid assets as
a fraction of their value than do their U.S. counterparts. There are several
possible explanations for this, such as the institutional requirement by
lenders that borrowers maintain compensating balances. Whatever the reason,
the presence of these low yield, low risk assets on Japanese balance sheets
probably acts to exaggerate the debt-equity ratios used to finance real
investments and the rates of return required and earned on such investments.—15-
To measure the importance of this, we calculated (in two alternative
ways) the differences in average U.S. and Japanese ratios of liquid assets to
market value, and subtracted the implied "excess" liquid assets from both
sides of the Japanese balance sheet, at the same time subtracting the imputed
earnings on such assets based on the rate of return on deposite-like items
given in the Bank of Japan Statistical Monthly. This correction has the
desired effect of netting these extra liquid assets against debt •and adding
the gap between the borrowing cost and rate of return on such funds to the
cost of other borrowing for other assets.
Depending on the measure of excess liquid assets, this correction raises
the average before-tax return to capital in Japan by .5 or 1.1 percentage
points, still leaving an apparent cost-of-capital gap of between 4.7 and 5.3
percentage points, of which at most .2 percentage points can be explained by
the greater level of Japanese borrowing.
5. Market Return Measures of the Cost of Capital
It is well known that the equities of firms with high growth prospects
often sell at price-earnings ratios well above any reasonable measure of the
inverse of the after tax cost of equity capital. This is fully rational if
investors anticipate that the firms have access to projects with hi9h marginal
products, since the excess returns (over the cost of capital) on these future
projects should be capitalized into the current stock price.6 This would
certainly not represent a cost of capital reduction, only a difference in the
composition of true economic earnings: a greater fraction would be accounted-16-
for by capital gains, in excess of retained earnings. Hence, our measures
thus far based on corrected book earnings would understate the cost of capital
for such firms. Since Japan has experienced a higher growth rate than the
U.S. in the past two decades, the lower earnings-price ratios in Japan may
simply mean that Japan is a composite of "growth firms" compared to the U.S.
To assess this possibility, one must use data on returns to equity
investors that include the capital gains component. We consider one such
measure in this section, the actual holding period returns to equity in each
year, equal to dividends plus capital gains. This measure has the advantage
of being an observed return to the investors who determine the cost of equity
capital.7 Its major shortcoming is that it is extremely volatile, so that
even over several years its mean could be a very misleading measure of the
expected return to equity.8
A second problem is that if there is a change in the cost of equity
capital, the market return to equity will move in the opposite direction in
the short run. For example, if the required return rises, share prices must
fall to permit subsequent returns to satisfy the new higher rate. Thus,
during the transition to a higher cost of capital, the estimated cost of
capital would actually be lower than the true value.
With these potential problems in mind, we now present, in Table 5,
estimates based on this measure of the return to equity. We also present
calculations of the the overall returns to capital before tax and after tax
based on the returns to equity, following the same methodolgy used in
calculating corrected returns to capital from corrected equity measures in the
previous section. While the annual statistics of the measures are—17—
substantially more volatile than those based on corrected book earnings, the
sample averages are not unreasonable.
For Japan, the average market return to capital, before tax, was 5.7
percent, close to the 6.5 percent average based on corrected book measures in
Table 3. It is worth pointing out, however, that the Japanese price earnings
ratio has increased over the same period. If this were due to a decline in
the equity cost of capital over time, then the argument given above would
suggest that the average of 5.7 percent based on actual market returns may
overstate the cost of capital over this period.
For the United States, the average before tax return to capital based on
actual market returns is 8.1 percent, substantially below the corresponding
average corrected book measure given in Table 3, 12.3 percent. This lower
return is attributable to the very poor U.S. stock market performance during
the 1970s, when real returns averaged only 3.6 percent, which is well below
their historical average. If an historical measure were used in place of 3.6
percent, the resulting return to capital would be very close to that given in
Table 3. On the other hand, if we had been able to include data for the very
successful stock market year 1984 in Japan, this would have raised the sample
average return in that country.
Because of the remaining uncertainties about these market-return-based
measures, we must conclude, therefore, that these additional data do not shed
much light on whether there really is a substantial gap in the cost of capital
between the two countries.-18-
6. Issues for Future Research
What can be the source of the large apparent gap in the real before-tax
cost of funds in the U.S. and Japan? It is easier to identify incorrect
answers than correct ones. As we showed above, the fraction of before tax
corected earnings paid in corporate taxes is generally higher in Japan than in
the U.S. Put another way, the returns to capital, even after—tax, differ by a
substantial amount, suggesting that one must go beyond the corporate tax
burden to explain the differences in rates of return. A second explanation
that can account for at most a small fraction of the difference is the
combination of tax deductibility of interest payments and the greater Japanese
use of debt in corporate capital structure.
The problem, then, is to explain the large gap in the after-tax returns
to capital in the two countries. There are at least three possible
explanations, each having different policy implications. The first is that
Japanese firms may be less risky than those in the U.S. or Japanese investors
less risk averse than U.S. investors. In either case, a lower risk premium
would be required to satisfy investors.
This argument is related to the one we considered above, that the
Japanese rate of return on real, presumably risky investment, is understated
by the combination of such assets with substantial liquid assets on corporate
balance sheets. However, our findings are that the returns are lower in Japan
even when the mix of assets is standardized in the two countries. The
evaluation of whether the real investments of Japanese corporations are less
risky or Japanese investors less risk averse would require data and—19
theoretical modelling beyond the scope of this paper, but represents one
important line for future research.
There remain two other possible explanations for the lower returns in
Japan that we cannot address using our data. One is that Japanese households
require a lower return from corporations because of the favorable individual
tax treatment of capital income. This explanation has been suggested by
Shoven and Tachibanaki (1985), who estimated a much lower rate of capital
income taxation at the individual level in Japan. However, for this
explanation to hold, it would also be necessary that the favorable Japanese
tax treatment of individual savings apply only to domestic assets. Otherwise,
the same saving incentive would also reduce the cost of capital for purchases
of U.S. assets by Japanese savers directly or by the Japanese firms in which
they hold debt and equity. A second possibility is that the large pool of
Japanese savings has not, at least until recently, been permitted free access
to foreign capital markets, forcing funds generated in Japan to be invested at
lower rates than those prevailing in the U.S. and elsewhere.
It is difficult to know which of these three explanations are
quantitatively important. More research is clearly needed and would be
valuable, since the appropriate policy responses would be different according
to the source of the difference in the rates of return. If riskiness or
attitudes toward risk differ, there is little action warranted. If capital
markets have been closed, then the recent trend toward liberalization should
lead to a reduction in the gap. If individual tax differences are important,
then a reconsideration of their effects, both in the U.S. and Japan, may be
appropriate. Recent and pending changes between the two countries with-20-
respect to the tax treatment of savings and the openness of capital markets
should provide the opportunity for future empirical research to address these
questions.—2 1—
Footnotes
1.Available at the Wharton Computing Center, University of Pennsylvania.
These tapes cover most firms listed on the New York and American Stock
Exchanges. We have excluded all financial firms from our analysis. Our
sample size is 1095, except for the calculations reported in Table 5, for
which we have complete data for 1443 firms..
2.Since we have not been able to arrange direct access to these tapes, we
are most grateful to Professors Fumio Hayashi and Kanemi Ban of Osaka
University who carried out the basic computations on Nikkei tapes available at
Osaka University and made the results available to us. Here again, firms
included are all those listed on the Tokyo Exchange, excluding financial
firms. The sample size is 1287, and 1297 for the calculations reported in
Table 5.
3.This procedure was also used by Auerbach (1984), where it is described
and evaluated more fully.
4.An unambiguous determination of nominal assets and liabilities is
difficult. The use of alternative measures caused estimated rates of return
to move up and down in the U.S. and Japan by as much as 1.5 percentage points,
but with virtually no impact on the differences between the countries.
5.To bring the accounting with respect to this item to a cash basis as in
the case for U.S. corporations, we have subtracted the net change in this
account from the current costs of Japanese companies.
6.This can be rigorously shown using, for instance, the "q" theory of
investment. Suppose there is the anticipation that an outward shift will—22—
occur -in the production frontier in the future, increasing the marginal
product of capital. This will increase investment, and market value,
immediately, decreasing measured earnings in the short run because of capital
deepening. Hence, one would observe a low earnings-price ratio in the short
run. The capitalized value of higher future marginal products rises as their
date of appearance nears, giving investors a sufficient overall return to
equity.
7. If the marginal source of equity funds is retained earnings, rather than
new shares, then one should adjust dividends in this calculation, multiplying
them by a factor less than 1 that represents the relative cost to the firm of
delivering an after—tax dollar to the investor in the form of capital gains as
opposed to dividends. This is the ratio (1-9)1(1-c), where 0 is the dividend
tax rate and c is the accrual-equivalent of the capital gains tax. See
Auerbach (1979, 1983). This correction is important in the current context to
the extent that dividend yields differ between the U.S. and Japan.
8.An alternative measure is the sum of dividends plus the trend growth rate
of dividends (adjusted for the dilution of new share issues and net of the
annual inflation rate) since, in the long run, the rate of capital
appreciation of equity must equal the rate of dividend growth. Unfortunately,
the anomalous Japanese dividend behavior over this period makes such an
approach problematic. Over this entire period, aggregate dividends in our
sample adjusted for dilution did not grow in real terms! This remarkable fact
seems to be consistent with statistics reported in the Annual Report on
National Accounts of Japan's Economic Planning Agency (EPA). Moreover, many
of the Japanese companies in our sample had zero dividends at the beginning or—23-
the end of the sample period, making the calculation of a growth rate
impossible.
9.The geometric average real rate of return on common equity in the U.S.
over the period 1926-86 was 7.0 percent; the arithmetic average was 9.0
percent. See Ibbotson Associates (1987).-24--
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Earnings Price Ratio and Return to Total Capital, Nonadjusted
E/P After Tax
Year U.S. Japan
R/K After Tax R/K Before Tax
U.S. Japan U.S. Japan
1967 .066 .080 .061 .060 .104 .097
1968 .057 .104 .053 .067 .097 .108
1969 .052 .094 .049 .065 .089 .103
1970 .055 .096 .051 .067 .091 .107
1971 .064 .102 .057 .066 .103 .108
1972 .061 .078 .055 .057 .103 .095
1973 .067 .055 .062 .049 .114 .087
1974 .096 .060 .083 .053 .166 .089
1975 .124 .049 .095 .051 .185 .092
1976 .115 .041 .092 .047 .173 .087
1977 .107 .048 .090 .047 .167 .087
1978 .131 .048 .107 .043 .198 .080
1979 .162 .051 .128 .043 .226 .081
1980 .140 .052 .116 .047 .206 .089
1981 .109 .061 .099 .053 .175 .100
1982 .094 .045 .085 .044 .153 .087
1983 .103 .047 .090 .044 .158 .083
1984 .092 NA .084 NA .149 NA
Average .094 .065 .081 .015 .147 .093Table 2
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Earnings Price Ratio and Returns on Capital, Adjusted
Year
E/P After Tax R/KAfterTax R/K Before Tax
U.S. Japan U.S. Japan U.S. Japan
1967 .062 .116 .053 .037 .090 .074
1968 .053 .155 .042 .050 .075 .090
1969 .049 .132 .037 .048 .069 .087
1970 .051 .145 .037 .040 .075 .080
1971 .059 .144 .040 .044 .084 .085
1972 .055 .125 .040 .037 .086 .074
1973 .059 .118 .042 .007 .092 .046
1974 .084 .153 .049 -.031 .127 .005
1975 .121 .082 .057 .007 .139 .047
1976 .100 .049 .062 .008 .137 .048
1977 .091 .055 .060 .012 .133 .052
1978 .114 .046 .073 .013 .155 .049
1979 .148 .038 .090 .021 .178 .049
'980 ..129 .050 .080 .030 .161 .071
1981 .096 .064 .061 .038 .131 .085
1982 .077 .045 .052 .034 .114 .076
1983 .086 .040 .066 .038 .127 .076
1984 .075 NA .062 NA .119 NA






















Ratios are of financial liabilities (corrected for Japan to
exclude pension reserves) to the sum of those liabilities plus
the market value of equity.Table 5
Returns to Capital, Based on Market Returns to Equity
E/P After Tax
Year U.S. Japan
R/K After Tax R/K Before Tax
U.S. Japan U.S. Japan
1967 .224 -.067 .178 -.030 .222 .008
1968 .079 .290 .059 .099 .104 .146
1969 -.135 .145 -.113 .055 -.071 .094
1970 -.038 -.152 -.034 —.073 .006 -.031
1971 .111 .071 .075 .021 .120 .063
1972 .146 .712 .105 .228 .152 .265
1973 -.229 -.050 -.181 -.064 -.131 -.031
1974 -.350 -.353 -.260 -.238 -.184 -.197
1975 .300 .076 .155 .004 .238 .048
1976 .182 .067 .111 .014 .188 .055
1977 -.104 .036 -.078 .006 -.002 .046
1978 .010 .105 -.002 .035 .086 .073
1979 .110 .069 .057 .034 .151 .074
1980 .208 .023 .125 .018 .213 .062
1981 —.149 .138 -.109 .069 —.034 .118
1982 .128 —.011 .082 .009 .151 .053
1983 .197 .176 .136 .091 .204 .129
1984 -.045 NA -.024 NA .043 NA
Average .105 .075 .016 .016 .081 .057